International pressure on Russia and the sanctions imposed on defense and technology mobilize Russian secret intelligence groups abroad.Ā With Russian spies under diplomatic cover revealed, there have been more and more deep-cover agents disclosed starting from the beginning of 2022, who had been infiltrated by Moscow in late 80s and 90s.
It can now be argued there is a wide network of secret intelligence agents in Europe, affiliated with both Russian military and political intelligence.
Most of them left Russia with their families following the Soviet collapse. Most of them have a technical background and own small technology firms. The second cover is the service sector, as it permits contacts with those having access to classified information.
Such conclusions could be made on the base ofĀ the arrest of a Russian married couple in Sweden, on charges of espionage.Ā
The arrest took place in dramatic fashion in the early hours of Tuesday, November 22.Ā AccordingĀ to the Swedish media, members of the security forces descended via tactical ropes from two Blackhawk helicopters, as startled residents in the typically quiet Stockholm suburb of Nacka looked on.
The raidĀ wasĀ apparentlyĀ conducted based on information received by Swedenās counterintelligence agency, the Swedish Security Service (SAPO), coupled with tips from the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The targets of the operation were Sergei Nikolaevich Skvortsov and Elena Mikhailovna Kulkova,Ā a Russian-born married couple, who moved to Sweden from Russia in 1999. According to their identity documents, Skvortsov was born in Perm on July 28, 1963, and Kulkova in Moscow on May 22, 1964.
Both Skvortsov and Kulkova are university-educated, with a background in science, mathematics and cybernetics. Upon settling in Sweden, they worked in the import-export technology sector. By 2013 they had become Swedish citizens and had a son. Kulkova also had a daughter from a previous marriage.Ā
BellingcatĀ claims thatĀ shortly before leaving for Sweden, Skvortsov and KulkovaĀ gotĀ an apartmentĀ inĀ Zorge Street,Ā at the same address as Denis Sergeyev, oneĀ of those who poisonedĀ the Skripals, who worked forĀ 29155Ā Russian military intelligence unit.Ā This unit is associated withĀ General Ilchenko whoĀ oversawĀ disinformationĀ campaigns, including the Bonanza projectĀ spreading false theories onĀ MH-17.
Kulkovaās daughter, Anna Run, was a cohabiting partner of the ex-head of Swedish military intelligence department. Anna left for Sweden as a child and had no time to obtain Russian citizenship. Annaās patronymic is Vladimirovna, not Sergeyevna, which casts doubts on the fact she is Kulkova and Skvortsovās daughter. It is highly likely, however, she was also involved in intelligence operations.
A company namedĀ European Technical TradingĀ wasĀ Skvortsovās Building and Data TechnologiesĀ counterpart. Skvortsov receivedĀ regularĀ paymentsĀ thereĀ of exactly the sameĀ amount. The SwedishĀ governmentĀ suspectsĀ the transactions wereĀ bogus, withĀ money pumpingĀ from the Netherlands to Sweden, in fact.Ā We believeĀ these transactions wereĀ toĀ proveĀ the companyās activity and legitimizeĀ Skvortsovās income.Ā This moneyĀ was unlikely paid for intelligence needs.Ā The purposeĀ was to maintain theĀ cover storyĀ forĀ RussianĀ deep-cover agents.Ā The Dutch company was run by the Belgian Hans de Geetere, whose companies had previously been hit by US sanctions for trying to resell American technology used in missiles and aircraft to China.
Skvortsov was a managing director at Instrument Electronics i Stockholm AB, owned by Kulemekov, a retired Russian military intelligence colonel (whoās likely to have a cover job today). He was expelled from Paris in 1981, over spying for military intelligence.
According to the court indictment, Skvortsov and Kulkova began to actively spy against the United States in 2013 and against Sweden in 2014.
The Skvortsov-Kulkova case shows that deep-cover agents had been put on hold for long 23 years, needed to legalize them. It meansĀ Russia has to activate its inactive spies. Long time on hold and the terms set by intelligence centers cause them to fail.Ā These disclosures, meanwhile, allow to shape a profile of Russian deep-cover agents, identify the basis of their cover stories, and verify those who meet these characteristics. It is objectively possible now to eliminate most of Russian spies in Europe and the U.S., amid turbulent environment, difficulties in contacts with Moscow, and high-strain job they have.
