James Holmes
U.S. Navy, East Asia
The more flags fly in contested expanses the better.
Here’s What to Remember:Ā U.S. Pacific Command boss Admiral Phil Davidson recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that allies will join future freedom-of-navigation deployments.
The question is a hardy perennial among those who hold forth about maritime strategy in Asia: are āfreedom of navigationā operations enough? Are periodic cruises through waters where a coastal state claims rights and prerogatives beyond those codified by treaty enough to safeguard maritime freedom?
Answer: freedom-of-navigation operations are necessary but not sufficient guarantors of āfreedom of the sea,ā the nearly limitless liberty to use the sea for mercantile and military pursuits, and of the liberal system of seagoing trade and commerce it underwrites.
Freedom-of-navigation operations are necessary for legal reasons. As retired Royal Navy admiral Chris Parry likes to say, navigational freedoms are something like the āright of wayā in English common law. They endure as long as seafarers use them. The right of way permits citizens to traipse across private property along certain pathwaysĀ providedĀ people actually exercise that right. If no one does, the right of way has a way of lapsing over time. Ownership reverts to the landās holder in full.
Use it or lose it.
Similarly, if a coastal state like China or Russia asserts outsized claims to jurisdiction over offshore waters and no one challenges those claims, its claimsāeven though unlawfulāhave a way of calcifying into international custom over time. International law is a system of customary law as much as it is a system of written treaties and agreements. If navies and merchant fleets fail to exercise their rights under the law of the sea to their fullest, compliance with the coastal stateās demands could begin to look like consent to those demands. Acquiescence could become the reigning customāand if so freedom of the sea will have been abridged in the waters at issue.
Hence the necessity to defy extralegal claims early and often.
Freedom-of-navigation cruises are insufficient for military and diplomatic reasons. These are come-and-go operations whereas a broad swathe of the seafaring world should go to contested waters and stay in order to make a statement that resonates regarding freedom of the sea.
Think about it. What does an American warship accomplish when it passes by a Chinese-held rock in the South China Seaāin 2016 an international tribunal ruled that none of the Spratly or Paracel islands qualifies as an island in a legal senseāand leaves? It exercises the right of way codified by the law of the sea. Thatās good.
But in all likelihood a Chinese warship will have shadowed it, will have instructed it to leave, and may have harassed it during its transit. The fact that U.S. Navy vessels do come and go lends credence to a diplomatic narrative issuing from Beijing. The tale goes something like this:Ā Americans broke into our territorial waters and we chased them off. Chinese spokesmen essay a sort of diplomatic alchemy. They try to portray demonstrating on behalf of freedom of the sea into cutting and running from an embattled zone. If a critical mass of influential audiences buys the Chinese line, it becomes reality in their minds until and unless debunked.
How to deflate Chinaās narrative? Rather than put in the occasional fleeting appearance, friends of navigational freedom should show up in disputed waters such as the South China Sea, and they should stay. Constancy should be their watchword.
Fortunately, Washington and likeminded capitals seem to have alighted on such a strategy. U.S. Pacific Command boss Admiral Phil Davidson recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that allies will join future freedom-of-navigation deployments. The more flags fly in contested expanses the better.
Thatās why recent news out of allied capitals is so heartening. For instance, Tokyo dispatched one of its āhelicopter destroyers,ā or light aircraft carriersāthe pride of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forceāto operate alongside U.S. Navy units in the South China Sea. In so doing Japanās political leadership stated that it will not buckle under Chinese pressure anywhere around the Asian rim.
Europeans have gotten into the act. London dispatched a Royal Navy amphibious transport to the region last fall to put in appearance near Chinese rocks, and last month a Royal Navy frigate joined U.S. Navy ships in Southeast Asia for several days of combined operations. Great Britain even intends to open a military base in the South China Seaāpunctuating its return to seaways āeast of Suezā decades after decolonization. A base would anchor the British and allied presence in the regionāhelping naval forces go there and remain.
European aircraft carriers will soon join the mix. Paris has announced that the nuclear-powered flattopĀ Charles de Gaulle, fresh from its midlife overhaul, will journey to the South China Sea this year. Britainās first supercarrier,Ā Queen Elizabeth, will follow this year or nextāand a U.S. Marine Corps squadron flying F-35 stealth fighters will join her air arm. London has bruited about the idea of creating an Anglo-French carrier forceāhelping Europeans maintain a constant and formidable presence in waters claimed by China. Paris isnāt quite there yet, politically speaking, but even talking about pooling naval resources constitutes progress.
And if the allies sustain their on-scene naval presence for a long time? Beijing will find it increasingly tough to convince others its navy has chased off ships that never leave. Its parable of Chinese power and allied weakness will no longer pass the giggle test.
Turn to strategic theory in closing. Admiral J. C. Wylie describes control of somewhere or something as the purpose of military strategy, and he depicts the āman on the scene with a gunāāthe soldierāas the final arbiter of control. The soldier appears on the scene and stays, outgunning local resistance. He embodies control of dry land. HeĀ isĀ control, says Wylie.
Teleporting Wylieās logic seaward, naval forces on the scene that boast serious firepower are the saltwater counterparts to the soldier. If they mount a standing presence, forces flying not just American but Asian and European flags can belie Chinaās efforts to impose control as well as its self-boosterism. Its creeping encroachment on freedom of the sea could stall as the seafaring world rallies.
Is success in this armed conversation a foregone conclusion? Hardly. The outcome of strategic competition never is. But an enduring, multinational show of power and resolve might prove sufficient to curb the China challenge.
James HolmesĀ is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and author of āVisualize Chinese Sea Power,ā in the current issue of the Naval InstituteĀ Proceedings. The views voiced here are his alone.
This article is being reprinted due to reader interest.
Image: Flickr.
The National Interest

