
Washington is bracing for the impact of the new House Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government which is to be led by Rep. Jim Jordan, the incoming chairman of the Judiciary Committee and a politician deeply aligned with former President Donald Trump and his MAGA movement. Republicans and conservative media are comparing the new group to the 1970ās era Democratic-led Church Committee that investigated Executive Branch intelligence abuse and spurred the congressional oversight process for the U.S. intelligence community that exists today.
According to Jordan and GOP organizers, the purpose of the committee is to investigate how the executive branch allegedly gathered information on citizens and worked across both the government and the private sector āto facilitate action against American citizensā in silencing conservatives āat all levels.ā Their premise is that U.S. government institutions, principally law enforcement and the intelligence community, have been āweaponizedā by Democrats to repress legitimate, conservative political agendas.
I served for more than 34 years in the CIAās Clandestine Service and made multiple journeys to Capitol Hill to brief oversight members on the most sensitive aspects of agency operations. I detailed the CIAās successes, as well as its failures. The experiences were time-consuming and not always pleasant, but I firmly believe that congressional oversight is a necessary and essential component of a functioning democracy. The process facilitates public trust and provides for appropriate accountability and reforms, as needed, for a secret organization like the CIA as it operates in an open and democratic society.
But thatās oversight, a bipartisan endeavor conducted in the interest of all Americans, regardless of political affiliation. The oversight structure that came from the Church Committee investigations adopted legal and sensible rules of the road and protections for all stakeholders. Such supervision is conducted in controlled settings, shielded from public exposure, in a way that promotes candor and trust among both the auditors and the audited, facilitating transparency.
Thatās not to say itās perfect. Iāve seen lawmakersā bias for or against various programs unrelated to partisan politics cloud their judgment. One example was the largely bipartisan seduction of members of Congress by the Predator armed drone program, which dazzled with extraordinarily slick videos featuring the bells and whistles of precision strikes that often supplanted important conversations about targeting methodology and strategic effectiveness. Or membersā fascination with a tool or tradecraft methodology they funded, despite CIA disinterest that impeded rather than facilitated mission success.
Still, up until my 2019 retirement, with few exceptions, I found that oversight members acted responsibly, at least behind the closed doors of our engagements. Similarly, and again with a few exceptions, members were unlikely to leak or make political fodder from what they came to learn, good or bad. The CIA took its deserved lumps when appropriate, but also came away at times with even more support than had been requested for critical initiatives.
Not Oversight
Jordanās committee will not be oversight. Rather, it promises to be the very politicized weapon it claims interest in exposing. The bodyās spectacle and powers pose dangerous implications for the ability of the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities to effectively conduct their mission.
The CIA strives to adhere to the mandate that it does not operate as a policymaking institution, though there have been unfortunate exceptions. The CIAās misguided endorsement of the George W. Bush White Houseās contention that deposed Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein retained weapons of mass destruction is one famous example. And arguably, former CIA Director Gina Haspelās deflection of Havana Syndrome concerns and reported interference with reporting that cast Russian leader Vladimir Putin in a bad light so as not to provoke President Donald Trump is another.
But itās a requirement that CIA officers embrace and that Director William Burns affirmed in a rare December 2022 PBS interview. āWe are an apolitical organization,ā Burns observed. āOurĀ job is to provide the best intelligence that we can collect and analyze to the president, to policymakers, to discuss that with our Oversight Committees in the Congress as well, and to do that without any policy agenda, any whiff of politics.ā
The reality is that the CIA generally does not offer recommended courses of action or suggest a right or wrong approach to policymakers. CIA officers are so conditioned to refrain from policy prescriptive prose that my own transition to writing publicly on national security matters has frustrated no small number of editors. CIA officers are trained to tell it like it is, warts and all, and ideally, have the courage to speak truth to power, even as uncomfortable as it could be before Congress. Itās literally written in stone at our entrance: āAnd ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free.ā
Intelligence officers are trained to see the world without absolutes, judgment, political bias, or even in the context of their own religious beliefs and personal values. Whether raw reporting from field agents or finished intelligence products, their language is clinical, without passion, and excludes even mention of U.S. policy, let alone criticism. Thatās not a moral issue, but rather a requirement for objectivity in getting things right. Absolutes, judgment, and the like are filters that undermine oneās ability to see the world as it is, rather than how we would like it to be. Emotion and qualifiers convey imperative and can come across as a policy prescriptive. These characteristics are unfortunately more prevalent among policymakers, on both sides of the political aisle.
The Intelligence Community-Policymaker Tension
Herein lies the ultimate tension between intelligence professionals and the decision-makers they support. For the most part, national-level leaders, even autocrats, are politicians who see the world through ideological prisms aligned with their supporters and constituencies (though itās sometimes unclear who is following whom). They represent platforms and ideology, coming into their jobs with predetermined judgments and, in democracies, campaign promises that limit maneuvering room. The enlightenment of even reliable intelligence does not necessarily always sway their thinking.
As a CIA case officer whose career required befriending and recruiting sources with moral standings that varied from selfless patriot to mercenary opportunist, my world was a no-judgment zone; my mission was to carry out lawful direction. Clinically, there was no absolute right and wrong, nor good versus evil, even among our enemies, but instead, we were forced to operate within the context of political realities. Not situational ethics per se, but rather a mindset concerning the need to mitigate risk and protect national security.
Nurturing this mindset among intelligence professionals is key to avoiding the political deep state Jordanās new committee contends it seeks to investigate and reform, but risks creating instead. One need look no further than how Russiaās systemic intelligence failures contributed to Putinās calamitous decisions in Ukraine. Putinās intelligence agencies may have validated the Russian dictatorās predetermined judgment that the war would be a short and largely uncontested affair. Putin appears to have been certain that Ukrainians would greet Russian forces as liberators or otherwise acquiesce, and that the United States and the worldās liberal democracies would lack the backbone to do more than protest and impose further toothless sanctions.
In Russiaās organized kleptocracy, where survival, let alone advancement, is secured by fealty, corruption, and personal networks, who is going to disagree with the party line, tell Putin that heās wrong, speak truth to power, and tell it like it is? Putinās intelligence echo chamber is systemically cultivated, from leadership to those in the trenches, resulting in skewed strategic assessments based on sloppy tradecraft and politicized analysis to fit the answers he and his cronies expect to hear.
Wasteful Durham Probe
During Trumpās tenure, then-Attorney General William Barr appointed U.S. Attorney John Durham as special counsel to investigate potential misconduct against the president or his associates in the Trump-Russia probe. Beginning in 2019, Durham was expected to reveal the deep state Trump claimed had created āthe hoaxā of Russiaās election interference and enmity toward the United States. The Durham investigation had cost at least $6.5 million through the end of 2022 but resulted in the conviction of only a single low-level FBI lawyer, who avoided jail by pleading guilty to doctoring a 2017 email that the FBI used to justify the surveillance of a former Trump campaign aide.
Durham had complete access to all of the intelligence, operational information, and personnel involved in the intelligence community and to law enforcement assessments and products, details including the nationās most sensitive secrets and capabilities. Moreover, then Director ofĀ National Intelligence John Ratcliffe, in an effort to assist Trumpās 2020 campaign, declassified nearly 1,000 pages of intelligence material for Durhamās use. He did so over CIA Director Gina Haspelās objection, an action that given the scale and the topic, Russia, put sources at risk and jeopardized the cooperation of agents and the CIAās foreign government partners. Still, as the New York Times just reported, āafter almost four years ā far longer than the Russia investigation itself ā Mr. Durhamās work is coming to an end without uncovering anything like the deep state plot alleged by Mr. Trump and suspected by Mr. Barr.ā
In addition to taking intelligence and law enforcement personnel offline from their work to answer questions, Durhamās inquiry struck fear among underpaid, junior-level intelligence and law enforcement professionals who had worked on the investigations, collection operations, and ensuing assessments that his probe targeted.
Civil servants, some of whom struggle just to make ends meet, suddenly had to concern themselves with the cost of expensive legal counsel and the threat of professional consequences for work that diverged from the presidentās narrative. āGo back to school,ā Trump angrily exclaimed, when the U.S. Intelligence Communityās 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment challenged many of his claims.
Itās hard to imagine Jordanās new committee finding evidence of politically motivated malfeasance in the U.S. Intelligence Community that eluded a determined, experienced, well-trained, and well-staffed Durham, who operated with the sitting presidentās support, unrestricted access, and essentially unlimited resources. But that doesnāt mean the committee wonāt cause havoc, at minimum posing a worrisome distraction and consuming time and resources the intelligence and law enforcement communities could better use to protect the country.
The greatest danger, though, is the impact on these communitiesā protection from political pressure. Professionals dedicated to national service will have to assess the risks of telling it like it is and speaking truth to power. Even those at the bottom of the professional ladder might find themselves having to lawyer up and consider the prospect of subsequent purges depending on who is in office. It also doesnāt make for good buzz among the talented Americans these agencies are trying to recruit into their ranks who might think twice about signing up.
The GOP and the American people need to reflect on what type of national security institutions they want: Russiaās failed system or a cadre of professionals committed to country rather than party and guided by the Constitution and their oaths. The wrong choice will ultimately be borne by us all in blood and treasure.
(Editorās note: Readers may also be interested in this article on the new select subcommittee by Noah Bookbinder, āDecoding the āSelect Subcommittee on Weaponization of the Federal Government.ā)
IMAGE: (L-R) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray, National Security Agency (NSA) Director Gen. Paul Nakasone, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Avril Haines, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Burns, and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Lt. General Scott Berrier testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee on March 10, 2022 in Washington, DC. The committee held a hearing on worldwide threats. (Photo by Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images)
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