Day: May 24, 2025

About a year earlier, in June of 1985, the Soviets had begun foiling dozens of sensitive American operations and rounding up agents working for the CIA and FBI. A few were lucky enough to escape. Some were sent to the gulag. Most got a 9mm bullet to the back of the head. The bloodbath was part of what the press dubbed the “Year of the Spy,” but the losses continued long after 1985. “There was a gut-wrenching sense of free fall,” Sellers writes in his forthcoming book, Year of the Spy, which chronicles the agency’s turbulent Cold War battle with the KGB in Moscow. “We didn’t know what had caused this disaster.”

Sellers hoped his agent, whom the agency codenamed “COWL,” might have information about how the Soviets were catching so many of their assets. But if the KGB unmasked COWL, he would be the next to die. COWL had been acting erratically and missed a scheduled meeting four months prior. His behavior led many in the CIA to worry he’d already been exposed, but the agency was desperate for information; it felt like the risk was worth it.

Two hours after he’d left the embassy, Sellers changed into a third disguise — a wig and mustache — then arrived at the pre-arranged meeting site: the parking entrance to an apartment building in Moscow’s tree-lined Lenin Hills district. But when he spotted COWL, Sellers sensed something was wrong. The once strong and confident man had lost weight and was cowering like a beaten dog. COWL had clearly been arrested and tortured. Sellers knew exactly what was coming next: a half-dozen vehicles descended. A group of KGB officers burst out of them, grabbed Sellers, threw him into a van and sped off towards Lubyanka, the KGB’s neo-baroque headquarters.

After hours of interrogation, the Russians released Sellers and expelled him from the Soviet Union. COWL fared far worse — he was tried and executed. To this day, his fate makes Sellers wonder: How did the KGB unravel the agency’s network of spies in Moscow?

The intense, decades-long investigation to answer that question would ultimately involve counterintelligence experts at both the FBI and the CIA. Among them: Paul Redmond, an abrasive, literary savant with a penchant for bowties and F-bombs, who became the head of CIA counterintelligence in the mid-1990s. His FBI counterpart was David Szady — the “Z-man,” as his peers called him — a charismatic, driven former chemistry teacher who, like Walter White in reverse, traded in his beakers and Bunsen burners for the rush of chasing spies at the bureau. He eventually became the FBI’s head of counterintelligence after 9/11.

Between 1985 and 2006, both Redmond and Szady played key roles in mole hunts that uncovered three high-profile Soviet spies responsible for the deaths of more than a dozen American assets. These investigations were among the most extensive and grueling in U.S. history. Hundreds of U.S. intelligence officials came under suspicion — a top spy hunter would become one of the prime suspects — disrupting or destroying some of their careers. “These are painful investigations,” Szady said. “They take a long time. But you have to run them to the end.”

In a series of exclusive interviews with POLITICO Magazine, Szady and Redmond — along with dozens of other former intelligence officials — revealed new details about their work together and the controversies that developed between their agencies as the FBI tried to solve what is arguably America’s greatest espionage mystery. Was there yet another Soviet mole — a so-called “Fourth Man” — at the highest levels of American intelligence?

That crucial search may now be imperiled by Kash Patel, the MAGA diehard and director of the FBI, who has expressed his desire to reorient his bureau away from intelligence work. In September 2024, Patel appeared on The Shawn Ryan Show and lambasted the FBI and its leaders, claiming they’re part of a Deep State conspiracy against Trump, going back to the Russia investigation that dogged his 2016 campaign and his first years in office. “The biggest problem the FBI has had has come out of its intel shops,” he said. “I’d break that component out of it. I’d take the … employees … and send them across America to chase down criminals.”

The FBI says it’s committed to catching spies. But if Patel follows through on this idea, he might weaken or even eviscerate the Bureau’s counterintelligence capabilities, making it easier for America’s enemies — China, Russia, Iran and others — to infiltrate the U.S. government and private companies. “We’re going to catch fewer spies and only know about the spies when it’s too late,” Frank Figliuzzi, a former assistant director for counterintelligence at the FBI, said. “That’s really dangerous.”

The prospect that the hunt for the “Fourth Man” — and other longstanding, deadly, spy vs. spy cases — might be ignored, is an affront to those who suffered and died from the betrayal, according to former counterintelligence officials. “If there’s someone out there who was the ‘Fourth Man,’” Sellers said, “there’s blood on their hands.”

‘We’ve got a fucking spy in this place’

For the Americans, the devastating compromises didn’t end with COWL. As 1986 dragged on, the KGB nabbed four more CIA assets. In October, the FBI learned that two agents they’d cultivated inside the Soviet embassy in Washington were dead. Months earlier, the KGB had lured both men back to Moscow to face trial and execution.

At CIA headquarters in Langley, Redmond, then the head of counterintelligence for Soviet and Eastern European operations, was deeply involved in the agency’s effort to find out what had happened. At first, they blamed Edward Lee Howard, a disgruntled former CIA officer who had been fired in 1983 for drug use, deception and theft. A KGB defector fingered Howard as a mole in August of 1985, but he fled to Moscow before the FBI could arrest him. The CIA quickly realized, however, that Howard couldn’t explain all their burned ops and dead assets. The agency was still losing people in Moscow, most of whom Howard had no knowledge of. To complicate matters, the KGB had been sending a stream of disinformation and double agents — fake defectors, fake scientists, even a fake priest — to try to dupe the CIA. “Nothing in this business,” Redmond recalled, “is what it fucking seems.”

As the Soviets were rounding up and killing U.S. assets in 1985, some of Redmond’s colleagues had a thought: What if a mole wasn’t the culprit? What if, for instance, their communications were compromised and that’s how the KGB had done so much damage so quickly? To test the theory, Milt Bearden, the CIA deputy division chief, along with Redmond and a small group of other high-level CIA officials, launched a clever cloak-and-dagger operation to find out. Bearden flew to Kenya, Redmond said, while another officer went to the CIA’s Moscow Station. Both sent cables falsely claiming the agency had recruited loyal KGB officers in Nairobi and Bangkok. If Moscow recalled their officers in either city, the CIA would know the Russians were listening. The KGB took no action against the officers mentioned in the cables, leading Redmond and his colleagues to conclude the Russians hadn’t tapped into their communications.

A few months later, however, as the KGB continued to foil CIA operations, the Soviets launched another, more elaborate, deception of their own. Beginning in March of 1986, around the time of Sellers’ arrest, they sent the agency a series of letters from a fake volunteer calling himself “Mister X.” These letters cast aspersions on a CIA officer, but perhaps most tellingly, they also warned that the KGB had penetrated the agency’s encrypted communications. This was a cunning lie, as the CIA already knew from their false cable operation. And for Redmond, the elaborate nature of the Mr. X deception was a clue. “They were trying to protect something really big in the CIA,” he told POLITICO Magazine. “That helped me get attention from upstairs that we’ve got a fucking spy in this place.”

Soon, Congress started paying attention as well. Paul Joyal, director of security for the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence at the time, recalls that the committee was “horrified by the [CIA’s] stable of Soviet assets wiped out in such a short period of time.” But initially, CIA leadership was reluctant to admit they might have more traitors in their ranks. Endless Soviet mole hunts had paralyzed the agency during the 1960s and 1970s. Senior CIA officials had seen the damage those investigations had done to operations as well as the lives and reputations of those who’d fallen under suspicion.

Despite the lack of enthusiasm, Redmond and a small team of trusted CIA colleagues launched a series of investigations, some in conjunction with the FBI. These mole hunts continued for more than three years as Redmond moved into a management position in the CIA’s Soviet and Eastern European division. But when he returned to spy hunting as the deputy chief of the agency’s newly created counterintelligence center in 1991, he realized they had made little to no progress. Redmond quickly pushed for a new mole hunt and added two FBI investigators to the team. Together, they built momentum and finally homed in on a second spy, CIA officer Aldrich Ames, who was flaunting his wealth. He drove a Jaguar and paid cash for an upscale house in Arlington, none of which he was seemingly able to afford. They turned the case over to an FBI squad led by Special Agent Les Wiser, who found the evidence they needed to prosecute Ames. Investigators pinned at least 10 dead assets on Ames’ treachery. Rudy Guerin, one of the FBI agents who debriefed the spy, described him as a “suit and tie serial killer.” In 1994, a judge sentenced Ames to life in prison.

The fact that it took the agency nearly a decade to nail Ames ignited outrage on the Hill. In response, CIA director James Woolsey reprimanded 11 top CIA officials. Yet he praised Redmond for keeping the investigation going, calling him the “[lone] voice crying out in the wilderness,” The New York Times reported. Woolsey soon promoted Redmond to be the associate director of operations for counterintelligence.

But it didn’t take long for the FBI and the CIA to realize Ames didn’t account for all the blown agents and operations. Another spy was still out there, still passing secrets to the Russians and still putting lives at risk.

Daring Escapes and Caviar Debts

Among the dozens of compromises the FBI felt Ames couldn’t explain was the case of Oleg Gordievsky. He was the KGB’s head of London spy operations, while living a double life as a British agent in 1985. Shortly after the CIA learned that Gordievsky was secretly working for the U.K., the KGB recalled him to Moscow, a clear sign they suspected him of being a traitor. Realizing that someone uncovered his espionage, Gordievsky alerted his British handlers at the MI6 spy agency, and they smuggled him out of the U.S.S.R. in the trunk of a car.

During Ames’ debrief, FBI interviewers determined he couldn’t have compromised Gordievsky. “We pulled all the dates for the timing and they just didn’t seem to work,” said Wiser, the FBI squad leader. It couldn’t have been Howard either — he was long gone by the time the CIA learned Gordievsky’s identity. Wiser hopped on a flight to London to interview the KGB turncoat in person. The FBI’s takeaway: another spy was out there, maybe even more than one.

And so, starting in 1994, the FBI expanded its mole hunt. Dozens of FBI agents and analysts, led by supervisor Mike Rochford, worked with their counterparts in the CIA to catch the spy or spies who were still passing secrets to the Russians and getting American assets killed. Their target’s codename: GRAYSUIT.

The investigation started with a pool of over 200 potential suspects. By 1996, Rochford’s team had whittled it to just over 10. Both FBI and CIA investigators felt rising pressure from their leadership to wrap up the investigation. Agents and analysts at the Bureau conferred with the top analysts in the CIA and they all agreed that the most likely suspect was an officer working in counterintelligence for the agency named Brian Kelley. “They had me convinced,” remembered Szady, who became the FBI executive in charge of the CIA’s analysts in its counterespionage group at Langley shortly thereafter.

As the hunt dragged on, FBI investigators surveilled and interrogated Kelley and even members of his family. Kelley was suspended from the agency, as was his daughter, Erin, also a CIA officer. His oldest son Barry recalls FBI investigators telling him his father’s arrest was “imminent.” For months Kelley’s children lived in dread of the day they would pick up a newspaper to read their father was “the worst spy since Benedict Arnold,” recalls Barry. The arrest never happened. The FBI never found any hard proof Brian Kelley had betrayed his country. But it feared more people would die unless they quickly wrapped up the case. As the decade came to a close, more than 19 agents working for U.S. intelligence had been killed, captured or disappeared.

Then, in 2000, Rochford and the FBI recruited an ex-KGB source who had exactly what they were looking for. He’d hand-copied GRAYSUIT’s entire KGB file and even pilfered a tape-recording of the spy speaking to his Soviet handlers from a phone booth in Fairfax County decades earlier. The catch? The source was in deep debt to the Irkutsk Mafia over a caviar deal gone bad and wanted a lot of money to give up the material. The FBI compensated the source with cash and benefits valued at $7 million and orchestrated a brazen operation to smuggle the mole’s top-secret KGB files out of Moscow.

Those files arrived at FBI headquarters in November 2000. Most of the investigators expected they would contain proof of Kelley’s treachery. The moment they heard the voice on the tape, however, they knew it was someone else. (Kelley was reinstated at the CIA in 2001, but neither the bureau nor the agency could undo the damage they had done to his life and career. He died in 2011.)

At first, the actual spy’s hushed speech, along with the poor recording quality, made it difficult for the bureau to identify him definitively. But FBI investigators pulled together key clues from the files that pointed unequivocally not toward Langley but someone inside their own building: Robert Hanssen, who’d run the FBI’s Soviet analytical unit in the 1980s and was now a liaison to the State Department.

It was a shocking, demoralizing moment for the bureau, especially after they’d been wrong about Kelley. Even worse, as the FBI prepared to gather evidence to arrest Hanssen, it realized that even he didn’t account for all of the dead agents and ops gone bad going back to 1985 — including the case of Gordievsky. That and dozens of other clues pointed to someone beyond Howard, Ames and Hanssen — a “fourth man.” The FBI realized it would have to start all over, looking for yet another spy.

‘I’m absolutely certain it was a CIA guy’

There was always a chance the FBI investigators were wrong — that no such mystery mole still lurked inside the highest echelons of the American government. But the mere possibility of it was a national security nightmare. In addition to threatening the lives of agents working for U.S. intelligence, such a high-level spy might also have access to military secrets, making it easier for America’s adversaries to kill U.S. or allied soldiers. Perhaps the most chilling possibility, though, was that this Russian asset had recruited a network of spies capable of undermining America for generations.

Outside of the FBI, and across other intelligence agencies, rumors spread about another Russian mole. Was it a man? A woman? Multiple people? Or was it all a mirage in the murky world of counterintelligence? Sporadic mentions of a mole leaked to the public. In their 2003 book, The Main Enemy, Bearden and James Risen first dubbed the alleged spy “the Fourth Man.” “I’m absolutely certain it was a CIA guy,” said Bearden, who was the deputy in charge of Soviet Bloc operations in 1985. “I didn’t come to that conclusion easily.”

Decades later, Robert Baer, a CIA officer turned best-selling author, dove into the mystery with his 2022 book, The Fourth Man. It’s about a secretive CIA unit composed of three women who began to review the agency’s blown cases in 1994. The evidence led them to create a profile of a possible spy or spies. Some of the leads would later turn out to match Hanssen, the FBI turncoat, though the women were instructed to disregard suspects in the bureau. Other leads, they told Baer, appeared to match one of their own bosses — Redmond, the senior CIA officer who had hunted down Ames. But after a series of conflicts with senior management, Baer writes, their superiors cut the three women off from access to the files they needed to pursue their leads. The only copy of their work disappeared, leaving them to fear someone had tampered with the investigation.

The book provoked intense backlash inside the intelligence community, in part because Baer named Redmond, who has never been charged with a crime. “Robert Baer’s book is hogwash, filled with mistakes and misinformation,” Redmond said in a written statement after its release. In an unprecedented public rebuttal, a cadre of former senior CIA officials came to Redmond’s defense. They pointed out numerous alleged errors in Baer’s book, disputed the conclusions and credibility of the three CIA investigators, and one even questioned whether the FBI seriously investigated anyone after Hanssen’s arrest in 2001.

But the FBI’s commitment to the hunt should not be in dispute, according to Szady. The bureau took the possibility of a “Fourth Man” seriously enough that it had profiled some of the CIA’s high-level officers. Szady, who became the FBI’s assistant director for counterintelligence in 2002, oversaw a series of probes and investigations during this period. All of them, he said, were based on credible leads and sources. “There was never a let up,” he said.

In the mid-2000s, the FBI received new intelligence reinforcing the idea that the KGB had a fourth mole in the highest ranks of the CIA. By 2005, the bureau had enough evidence to open a full, codenamed investigation into the new leads, and was trying to narrow the pool of suspects. But investigators ran into Washington politics when the director of national intelligence, John Negroponte, began considering one of their targets to head the National Counterintelligence Center. Szady had no choice but to inform Negroponte that the bureau was scrutinizing this senior intelligence official as a potential Russian spy. “The [FBI] Director agreed he should be briefed, [but] we weren’t saying anything about guilt” said Szady. “We told him ‘These are the facts’ and left it up to Negroponte.” (Negroponte was unavailable for comment.)

In an interview with POLITICO Magazine, Redmond — for the first time — confirmed that he was a subject of this FBI investigation and that he withdrew from the nomination so as not to taint the position. “I passed a message through one of [Negroponte’s] assistants that [he] should take me out of consideration,” Redmond said. “[I told him] I am damaged goods because there is this investigation of me.”

The ordeal pitted Szady’s FBI counterintelligence officials against Redmond, his former CIA counterpart — a man he liked and respected. It also exacerbated the lingering hostility from the Kelley investigation. Yet after months of aggressively chasing every possible lead, the FBI never found any hard evidence that Redmond had ever been a spy. They closed the investigation into him in 2007. “You can’t depend just on analysis,” like looking at compromised cases and source reporting, Szady said. “I learned my lesson on that with Kelley.”

Szady doesn’t believe Baer should have named Redmond in his book. Until there’s an indictment, he said, the bureau doesn’t want the subject or the public to know there’s an investigation. If something leaks, it could taint an innocent person’s reputation. The timing of Negroponte’s decision to consider Redmond, he added, was unfortunate. But investigating the veteran CIA officer was the only responsible thing to do, Szady maintained, based on the bureau’s leads and Redmond’s high-level access to sensitive operations. Even Redmond said he agrees: “I’m not pissed that the FBI investigated me. I would’ve investigated me. We lost a lot of cases and not all of them can be explained.”

Sellers, meanwhile, remains haunted by the mystery of the “Fourth Man.” In the decades since his arrest in 1986, he’s imagined what it was like when KGB executioners shot COWL and dozens of others like him in the basement of a Soviet prison. “It played like an unwanted movie in my mind,” he said. While researching his book during the 2000s, a period of detente with Russia, Sellers connected with many of the KGB men who had worked against the CIA back in the ’80s. He acquired thousands of pages of documents and dozens of hours of interviews. In one, a former KGB investigator hints that crucial information they used to identify COWL came from a source beyond Howard, Ames or Hanssen — seemingly evidence of a “Fourth Man.” Yet this clue, Sellers warned, could simply be part of an ongoing deception by the Russians. “Ninety-eight percent of what they tell you is true,” he said. “But it’s the other two percent that can get you in real trouble.”

Redmond said Russian intelligence is likely still spreading disinformation about the matter. During his debrief in 1994, Ames told one of the CIA’s key investigators, Jeanne Vertefeuille, that he and the KGB had planned to frame her as the spy in order to protect him. If the Russians were protecting yet another mole, a “Fourth Man,” Redmond said, they would have a good reason to frame him, too.

The CIA did not respond to a request for comment.

Today, 40 years after the “Year of the Spy,” the mystery of the “Fourth Man” remains. “All of the evidence, when taken as a whole picture, leaves too many compromises that can’t be attributed to known spies,” Szady said. “That’s my opinion, yes, there was a ‘Fourth Man.’”

And the FBI and CIA won’t know what damage this spy may have done to ongoing U.S. intelligence operations until they are caught and questioned. “That’s why there’s no statute of limitations on espionage,” Szady added.

‘We could be leaving the door wide open’

Szady retired in 2006 but the bureau remained so concerned about another spy that two FBI special agents interviewed a former CIA officer in 2019 about the matter, according to the officer. Three years later, before Baer’s book came out, officials from the bureau interviewed him as well, making the trek to his mountain home in a remote part of Colorado. The FBI investigators gave few details about what they were looking for and never mentioned anyone by name. “What their visit definitely did,” Baer said, “is tell me the FBI’s interest in the ‘Fourth Man’ is ongoing.”

Or it was. After several months of chaos and trepidation at the bureau, Patel has yet to publicly set a clear course for counterintelligence. The FBI appears to be moving to a regional command structure, according to The New York Times, but hasn’t announced further changes to its capacity to thwart spies, other than to suspend an analyst involved in investigating Russia’s 2016 election meddling.

“The FBI remains committed to counterintelligence investigations,” the bureau said in a statement to POLITICO Magazine. “Our adversaries continue their efforts to steal sensitive and often classified U.S. government and private sector information. The FBI will continue to be aggressive in detecting and disrupting their efforts.”

The Trump administration, meanwhile, continues to make friendly overtures to Moscow — reportedly halting the Pentagon’s offensive cyber operations against Russia, for instance. But few intelligence officials expect the Kremlin — let alone China or Iran — to suddenly stop spying on America. “They’re going to double or triple their efforts,” said Frank Montoya Jr., a retired FBI agent who was head of counterintelligence across all federal agencies from 2012 to 2014. “We could be leaving the door wide open.”

Szady is more optimistic. He agrees with Patel that the bureau needs to change to overcome perceptions of political bias after the investigations of Trump. Yet he says weakening counterintelligence or splitting it into another agency would be a mistake. “The bureau is still in the best position to be the lead agency to counter national security threats” alongside partners like the CIA, Szady said. As a law enforcement entity — and not a spy agency — the FBI is designed to make cases that are prosecutable in court while respecting the rights guaranteed in the Constitution.

Redmond, his former colleague — and former target of the investigation — concurs. Splitting out or weakening the FBI’s counterintelligence capability, he said, would be “fucking crazy” and a detriment to the type of long and intensive investigations that are so vital.

It took nine years of digging to arrest Ames and seven to get Hanssen. In the U.K., it took nearly 40 years to publicly unmask the last of the Cambridge Five, a network of spies that ravaged British intelligence at the height of the Cold War. Many of the key clues that helped cut through disinformation and deception to identify them came from Russian sources. Solving the mystery of the “Fourth Man,” former intelligence officials say, will likely hinge on another Russian source coming forward with new information.

But if Patel weakens or cripples the FBI’s counterintelligence capability, he’ll do the same to its ability to recruit, vet and protect such assets. “[The FBI and CIA] recruit sources all over the world,” said William Murray, a former CIA station chief and senior operations official. “They know what the penalty is going to be if they get caught. They’re going to get shot right in the back of the fucking head.”